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Abstract 
The emphasis of the Department of Defense on capability-based acquisition has led 
to the simultaneous development of systems that must eventually interact within a system-
of-systems.  Thus, system development and acquisition processes encounter 
interdependencies that generate complexity and risk.  The authors’ prior work has 
developed a Computational Exploratory Model to simulate the development processes of 
these complex networks of systems intended for a system-of-systems capability.  The 
model’s goal is to understand the impact of system-specific risk and system 
interdependencies on development time.  The progress documented in this paper focuses 
on the quantification of risk propagation and the impact of network topologies on the 
propagation of disruptions.  The improved model enables trade studies that differentiate the 
effectiveness of alternate configurations of constituent systems and that quantify the impact 
of varying levels of interdependencies on the timely completion of a project that aims to 






The purpose of capabilities-based acquisition, as described by Charles and Turner 
(2004), is to acquire a set of capabilities instead of acquiring a family of threat-based, 
service-specific systems.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), for example, uses capability-
based acquisition to evaluate the success of a program based on its ability to provide a new 
capability for a given cost, and not on its ability to meet specific performance requirements 
(Spacy, 2004).  The Joint Mission Capability Package (JMCP) concept is another example 
that aims to create a joint interdependency between systems to combine capabilities in 
order to maximize reinforcing effects and minimize vulnerabilities (Durkac, 2005).  The goal 
is a more efficient utilization of both human and machine-based assets and, in turn, 
improved combat power.   
To accomplish the desired capability, systems are increasingly required to 
interoperate along several dimensions that characterizes them as systems-of-systems (SoS) 
(Maier, 1998).  Systems-of-systems most often consist of multiple, heterogeneous, 
distributed systems that can (and do) operate independently but can also collaborate in 
networks to achieve a goal. Examples of systems-of-systems include: civil air transportation 
(DeLaurentis, Han & Kotegawa, 2008), battlefield ISR (Butler, 2001), missile defense 
(Francis, 2007), etc.  According to Maier (1998), the distinctive traits of operational and 
managerial independence are the keys to making the collaboration work.  The network 
structure behind the collaboration, however, can contribute both negatively and positively to 
the successful achievement of SoS capabilities and, even earlier, to the developmental 
success.  Collaboration via interdependence may increase capability potentials, but it also 
contains concealed risk in the development and acquisition phases.  Brown and Flowe 
(2005), for instance, have investigated the implications of the development of SoS to 
understand the drivers that influence cost, schedule, and performance of SoS efforts.  
Results of their study indicate that the major drivers—as indicated by subject-matter-
experts—include systems standards and requirements, funding, knowledge, skills and 
ability, system interdependencies, conflict management, information access, and 
environmental demands.   
Disruptions in the development of one system can have unforeseen consequences 
on the development of others if the network dependencies are not accounted.  The goal of a 
single system’s program manager is the mitigation of risk, leading to successful 
development of that specific system.  While direct or immediate consequences of decisions 
are nearly always considered, the cascading second-and-third order effects that result from 
the complex interdependencies between constituent systems in an SoS are often not, which 
make success all the more difficult.  It falls on acquisition managers and systems engineers 
(or systems-of-systems engineers) to understand and manage the successful development 
of a system, or family of systems, to produce the targeted capability in this challenging 
setting.  
Evidence is abundant that system-of-systems-oriented endeavors have struggled to 
succeed amidst the development complexity.  The Future Combat System is a latest 
example (Gilmore, 2006).  Civil programs have not been spared either, e.g., Constellation 
Program (Committee on Systems, 2004) and NextGen (2009).  Rouse (2001) summarizes 
the complexity of a system (or model of a system) as related to the intentions with which one 
addresses the systems, the characteristics of the representation that appropriately accounts 
for the system’s boundaries, architecture, interconnections and information flows, and the 





The work presented in this paper specifically targets complexities stemming from 
system development risk, the interdependencies among systems, and the span-of-control of 
the systems or system-of-systems managers and engineers.  The objective of the research 
summarized in this paper is to quantify the impact of system-specific risk and system 
interdependency complexities using a computational exploratory modeling approach.  The 
work comprises new improvements to a computational exploratory model (CEM)—a discrete 
event simulation model—previously introduced in prior Acquisition Symposia (Mane & 
DeLaurentis, 2009) that aims to provide decision makers with insights into the development 
process by propagating development risk in the SoS network and capturing the impact that 
system risk, system interdependencies, and system characteristics have on the timely 
completion of a program. We also briefly introduce complementary work related to an 
analytical approach to treat the same complexities via computations on conditional 
probabilities that relate the transmission of risk in network dependent systems.  
Computational Exploratory Model (CEM) Overview 
The CEM is based on the 16 basic technical management and technical system-
engineering processes outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2008a), often 
referred to as the 5000-series guide. However, an SoS environment changes the way these 
processes are applied. The Systems Engineering Guide for System-of-Systems (SoS-SE) 
(DoD, 2008b) addresses these considerations by modifying some of the 16 processes in 
accord with an SoS environment.  The resulting processes and respective functions consist 
of translating inputs from relevant stakeholders into technical requirements, developing 
relationships between requirements, designing and building solutions to address 
requirements, integrating systems into a high-level system element, and performing various 
managing and control activities to ensure that requirements are effectively met, risks are 
mitigated, and capabilities achieved. 
The CEM, centered on these revised processes, is a discrete event simulation of the 
development and acquisition process.  This process creates a hierarchy of analysis levels:  
SoS Level (L1), Requirement Level (L2), and System Level (L3).  Component elements at 
each level are a network representation of the level below.  The SoS Level (L1) is comprised 
of the numerous, possibly interdependent, requirements (L2) needed to achieve a desired 
capability.  Similarly, satisfaction of each requirement in the Requirement Level (L2) requires 
a number of possibly interdependent systems (L3).   Error! Reference source not found. 






Conceptual Model of Acquisition Strategy based on SoSE Process  
(described in DoD, 2008b) 
At the Requirement Level (L2), Requirements Development contains the technical 
requirements of the SoS (provided externally). The technical requirements are then 
examined in Logical Analysis to check for interdependencies amongst the requirements. A 
check for inconsistencies amongst requirements is also performed.  Design Solution 
development and Decision Analysis are the next processes, which belong to the System 
Level (L3). They produce the optimal design solution from the set of feasible solutions to 
meet the given requirements.  The optimal design solution is based not only on the current 
set of requirements and solution alternatives but also takes into account all previous 
information available through requirements, risk, configuration, interface and data 
management processes.  Because most acquisitions are multi-year projects involving many 
different parties, the overlap between the management processes, Design Solution and 
Decision Analysis processes, allows for greater tractability of decisions. It is at this stage 
that system interdependencies are identified.  The optimal design solution obtained from this 
phase is then sent to the next stage: Technology Planning and Technology Assessment. In 
the event that an optimal or sub-optimal design solution to successfully implement the given 





a change in the technical requirements for the SoS.  Technology Planning and Technology 
Assessment are System Level (L3) scheduling processes that oversee the implementation, 
integration, verification and validation for all the component systems in the SoS.  
Systems in the SoS are often dependent on other systems for either implementation, 
integration, or both.  Disruptions during these stages of development in one of the systems 
result in time-lags in the acquisition process and to delays that propagate through the 
network of component systems impacting seemingly independent systems. For example, if 
the implementation of a system A is dependent on the Implementation of a system B—as 
could be the case for the development of an aircraft that depends on the specifications of a 
radar system—funding cuts to system B can result in development delays in system B but 
can also impact the development of system A.  If, on the other hand, a third system C 
depends on system A, this could also be affected by the problems caused in system C due 
to funding cuts.  
The Implementation and Integration Phases of component systems constitute the 
lowest level of detail modeled in the CEM.  The design decisions made at earlier stages 
must be implemented and integrated in these phases to generate the final product of a 
program.  Error! Reference source not found. presents an abstraction of the layered 
networks that result from the modeling of the acquisition process: systems are grouped to 







Figure 1. Layered Network Abstraction of Computational Exploratory Model 
Systems can be independent, can satisfy several requirements, and can depend on 
other systems.  The CEM simulates these layered relationships to capture the impacts that 
any changes—related to decision-making, policy, or development—in any of the component 
systems, requirements, and relationships between them have on the completion of a project.  
The exercise of the CEM described in this paper specifically targets complexities stemming 
from system risk, the interdependencies among systems, and the span-of-control of the SoS 
authority (if present). The next section will present the model dynamics that make possible 
the study of these complexities and will explore the design space of the SoS authority and 
tradeoffs between development risk and the number of systems and system 





Detailed Model Dynamics 
The CEM operates as a discrete event simulator of the development process.  
Several challenges arise in developing a model for purposes of simulation and learning. 
Disruptions occur at various stages of development and are governed by the risk associated 
with the project or individual systems. The CEM models risk associated with the 
implementation and integration of each component system as well as the risk due to the 
system interdependencies.  Furthermore, systems and SoS engineers are often faced with 
the decision of using legacy assets to satisfy a given requirement or opt for the development 
of brand new ones.  The CEM includes parameters such as readiness-level to differentiate 
between legacy assets/platforms, new systems, and partially implemented/integrated 
systems (i.e., systems under development) and to investigate the impact that the inclusion 
of such systems in the development of an SoS has on the success of a project.  The next 
sub-sections describe the model details:  parameters and inputs, Implementation and 
Integration dynamics, and the risk model. 
Model Input Parameters 
Error! Reference source not found. presents the input parameters and the 
remainder of this section expands and explains their role in the ECM.    
Table 1. Input Parameters of Computational Exploratory Model 
Parameter Notation Description 
Requirement Level (L2) 
Requirement 
dependencies 
Dreq Adjacency matrix that indicates requirement 
interdependencies 
Risk profile Rreq Probability of disruptions in Requirement Development 
Phase  
Impact of disruptions Ireq Time penalty when disruptions hit Requirement 
Development Phase 
System Level (L3) 
System dependencies Dsys Adjacency matrix that indicates system interdependencies 
Development pace of 
design 
tdes Increase in completion of Design Solutions Phase  
Design risk profile Rdes Probability of disruptions in Design Solutions Phase 
Impact of design 
disruptions  
Ides Time penalty when disruptions hit Design Solutions Phase 
Span-of-control soc Indicator of how Implementation and Integration are 
performed (sequentially or simultaneously) 
System initial readiness-
level 
m0(i,r) Initial readiness-level of system i to satisfy requirement r (for 
Implementation Phase) 
System risk profile Rsys(i,r) Probability of disruptions (during implementation) of system i 
when satisfying requirement r 
Impact of disruptions Isys(i) Time penalty when disruptions hit system i during 
Implementation/Integration 
Implementation pace pimp(i) Increase in readiness-level at each time step during 
implementation of system i 
Integration pace pint(i) Increase in completeness-level at each time step during 
integration of system i 
Implementation start  limp(i,j) Readiness-level of system j when Implementation Phase of 
dependent system i begins  






The requirement dependency matrix (Dreq) indicates how the development and 
satisfaction of requirements depend on each other, which impacts the sequence in which 
requirements are developed and satisfied.  For example, if Requirement A depends on 
Requirement B, then development of Requirement A begins when Requirement B has been 
satisfied.  As requirements are developed, the risk profile (Rreq) of Requirement 
Development indicates the probability of disruptions at this stage in the development 
process. Disruptors signify a change in requirements or addition of new requirements. When 
a requirement is changed after the acquisition process has begun, it affects all subsequent 
processes and it causes a time delay (Ireq) that is added to the project time.  Every 
requirement that is implemented is fed into its own Design Solution and Decision Analysis 
(Error! Reference source not found.) process. The Design Solution and Decision Analysis 
processes feed into each other and the risk profile (Rdes) indicates the probability of 
disruptions at each time-step during the completion of the stage with a value between 0 and 
1.  Any disruptions at this stage indicate that the design solution provided is not feasible and 
a time penalty (Ides) that indicates a re-design of the solution is incurred.  If the solution fails 
in multiple consecutive time-steps, then the requirement is sent back to Requirement 
Development stage, otherwise the set of component systems and their user-defined 
parameters are sent to the Technical Planning and Technical Assessment (Error! 
Reference source not found.) processes based on the development-pace parameter of 
this stage. 
Implementation Phase Dynamics 
Technical Planning is the stage in which Implementation and Integration of 
component systems is performed.  The Implementation Phase simulates the development of 
each system.  The nature of candidate systems may range from legacy systems to off-the-
shelf, plug-and-play products to custom-built, new systems.  Development of a “brand new” 
SoS has been and will remain a rare occurrence.  In their study on SoS, the United States 
Air Force (USAF) Scientific Advisory Board (Saunders et al., 2005) stated that one of the 
challenges in building an SoS is accounting for contributions and constraints of legacy 
assets.  Similarly, the regular utilization of off-the-shelf component systems in both defense 
and civil programs contribute to cost and time savings but also introduce a different type of 
risk to the system development process (Constantine& Solak, 2010).  These legacy systems 
may be used “as-is” or may need re-engineering to fulfill needs of the new program.  
Here, we define legacy systems as systems that have been developed in the past to 
achieve a particular requirement, and new systems as not-yet-developed systems 
envisioned to satisfy a new requirement.   When considering the use of legacy systems to 
meet a new requirement, the capability of these systems to satisfy the new requirement is 
not necessarily the same as their capability to meet the original requirement for which they 
were designed.  Additionally, the risk associated with the modification of a legacy system 
and the risk associated with the development of a brand new system can be quite different.  
Legacy systems may, however, provide cost and/or time benefits if modifications are less 
severe than a new development, as is the case with new systems.  To delineate systems in 
a meaningful way, we describe the spectrum of a system’s ability to satisfy a requirement in 
terms of its readiness-level.   
System readiness-level, a concept proposed by Sauser et al. (2006), is a metric that 
incorporates the maturity levels of critical components and their readiness for integration (i.e. 





Technology Readiness Level (TRL), a metric that assesses the maturity level of a program’s 
technologies before system development begins (Department of Defense Directive 5000.2, 
2005).  While similar in spirit to the SRL metric proposed by Sauser, Verna, Ramirez-
Marquez, and Gove (2006), readiness-level in the present work is defined in a different 
manner and with less detail.  We define system readiness level as the readiness-level of a 
system i to satisfy requirement r, m(i,r), with a value between 0 and 1.  A system with a 
readiness-level of 1 is a fully developed system that can provide a certain level of capability.  
The dynamic model starts the Implementation Phase of a system from its initial readiness-
level and simulates its development/implementation until it reaches a readiness-level of 1.  
An initial readiness-level of 0 indicates a brand new system that must be developed from 
scratch, while a system with an initial readiness-level greater than 0 indicates a legacy 
system that is partially developed to satisfy a requirement r, but needs further development 
to reach a readiness-level of 1.  In general, careful research of a candidate system i will 
determine its initial readiness-level to satisfy a requirement r, and, therefore, the amount of 
development necessary to achieve a readiness-level of 1.0.   
The CEM simulates the Implementation Phase as a series of time steps in which a pre-
determined increment of readiness (pimp(i)) is gained at each time-step of each system i, or 
lost if a disruption occurs (according to the system risk profile of system i in satisfying 
requirement r, Rsys(i,r)).  This is clearly a gross simplification of the actual development 
process for a system; however, it adequately serves the purposes of the research, which is 
focused on the interdependencies between systems to develop an SoS capability and aims 
to capture the impact of disruptions on the development process.  Accurate modeling of the 
Implementation Phase would increase the accuracy of the model for a particular application, 
but it would not change the nature of the observed results. 
Representation of Risk 
The risk associated with the development of a system is a function of its inherent 
characteristics (technology, funding, and complexity levels) and on risk levels of the systems 
on which it depends.  The former may be estimated via a variety of analysis techniques that 
examine a system in detail, but the latter requires knowledge of system interdependencies 
which can be numerous, complicated, and often opaque.  Developmental interdependencies 
of SoS create layered networks that often span among a hierarchy of levels (DeLaurentis et 
al., 2008; Butler, 2001; Ayyalasomayajula, DeLaurentis, Moore & Glickman, 2008; 
Kotegawa, DeLaurentis, Sengstacken & Han, 2008).  The complexity of these networks 
often hides many of the otherwise explicit consequences of risk.  Depending on the network 
topology characteristics, disruptions to one of the critical nodes or links in the network can 
propagate through the network and result in degradation to seemingly distant nodes (Huang, 
Behara & Hu, 2008).   
In this study, we express risk as a density function that describes the probability of a 
disruption occurring at any time during the system development.  We concentrate on the 
Implementation and Integration Phase as the development stage in which disruptions occur.  
Here, inherent risk is the probability of disruptions due to the development characteristics of 
the subject system, e.g., technology readiness-level, funding, politics, etc.  Risk due to 
interdependencies, on the other hand, is the probability of disruptions during the 
Implementation Phase of a system due to disruption in the system on which the system of 
interest depends.  This is essentially the conditional probability of a disruption given that 





This study assumes that the inherent risk of a system i in satisfying requirement r, 
Rsys(i,r), is solely a function of its readiness-level, m(i,r).  While a somewhat simplified 
definition, expressing risk as a function of a system’s readiness-level is logical.  Recall that 
readiness-level is a metric that describes the necessary development of a system to satisfy 
a given requirement.  Therefore, risk changes as the readiness-level of a system increases.  
Equation 1 introduces a relationship between a system’s readiness-level and risk 
(probability of disruption). 
( ) ( )( )irimriR isys βα ,1, −=  
Equation 1 
In this relationship, αi (with a value between 0 and 1) is parameter that indicates the 
upper bound value of risk for system i (i.e., producing maximum probability of disruption), 
while βi is a shape parameter that indicates how quickly risk changes as a function of 
readiness-level.  This formulation implies that risk is highest at the early stages of 
development (e.g., low readiness-levels) and it decreases (at different rates depending on 
the value of the βi parameter) as development progresses.  For instance, when a system i 
has a readiness-level of 0.0—it is a brand new system—the probability of disruptions during 
development will be highest, and it will have a value αi.  However, when the system has a 
readiness-level of 1.0, the probability of disruptions will be 0.  System inherent-risk is 
implemented in the CEM by using a uniform random distribution to select a value between 0 
and 1 at each time-step of the Implementation or Integration Phase and passing it into a 
binary channel to see if the number is smaller or greater than the probability of disruption 
defined by Rsys(i,j).  This determines if a disruption occurs or not. 
When all systems are independent, identification of the system with highest risk is 
trivial (e.g., system that, on average, will contribute more to delays in completion time).  
However, when systems are interdependent, systems that otherwise have a low inherent 
risk can be greatly impacted by disturbances because of the transmission of risk from other 
systems.  Systems are impacted by nearest neighbors (those systems on which they directly 
depend; first-order dependencies) and by systems that impact those nearest neighbors 
(higher-order dependencies). 
The CEM models risk due to interdependencies in terms of the dependency strength 
between two given systems.  Dependency strength, S(i,j), is an input parameter that takes 
values between 0 and 1 and is defined as the conditional probability (uniform random 
probability) that system i has a disruption given that system j (on which system i depends) 
has a disruption.  Risk due to interdependencies is, therefore, a function of the readiness-
level of the dependent-upon system as well as the strength of that dependency.   A notional 
example of a simple SoS is utilized here to present these features of the CEM (Error! 
















Figure 2. Layered Network Structure of Example SoS  
Each system in this simple SoS network serves a role and provides a certain level of 
capability in order to satisfy some requirement.  The links between systems indicate 
interdependencies among systems.  The arrows indicate the directionality of dependence, 
including the case of mutual dependence.  Mane and DeLaurentis (2009) contain more 
detailed information on the CEM structure.  For this example, Error! Reference source not 
found. presents the implementation history of this three-system SoS with a risk profile that 
has αi, and βi, values of 0.2 and 4, respectively,  and two different levels of interdependency 
strength, S(i,j). 




























































                      a)  S(i,j) = 0      b)  S(i,j) = 1 
Figure 3. Implementation Phase History for Example Problem  
Each system has a different initial readiness-level—system-A of 0.3, system-B of 0.5, 
and system-C of 0.  Recall that an initial readiness-level greater than zero indicates a legacy 
system that must be further developed to achieve a readiness level of 1 to satisfy a given 
requirement.  The model assumes that the readiness-level of a system can reduce to below 
initial readiness-level value.  This is reasonable since inherent disruptions or disruptions due 
to interdependencies can result in modifications to subsystems that were not previously 
considered (i.e., unforeseen technology limitations of a system may require redesign of a 





(dependency strength of zero).  The occasional set-backs in the readiness-level of each 
system are due to disruptions stemming from the inherent system risk.  In Error! Reference 
source not found.b, one the other hand, dependency strength is highest (with a value of 
one).   Recall that dependency strength indicates the probability of disruption on the 
dependent system given that the system on which it depends has a disruption.  When the 
dependency strength is one, a disruption in a given system is always propagated to the 
dependent systems.  For example, disruptions in the development of system-C propagate to 
system-A with probability 1 and disruptions in the development of system-A propagate to 
system-B with probability 1.  Note, for instance, that there is a reduction in readiness-level in 
the development of the system-B every time that there is a reduction in readiness-level 
during the development of system-A or system-C (on which system-B depends).   The 
candidate systems for a desired capability can, in general, have different levels of 
dependency strengths.  Error! Reference source not found. presents a sensitivity of 
development time for this example problem on the value of dependency strength.    






























Figure 4. Impact of Dependency Strength on Completion Time for Example Problem 
As expected, higher dependency strength means higher development time.  In this 
example, the number of systems and interdependencies is invariable, and the increase in 
development time can be different for a different family of constituent systems.  When 
considering the development of different families of systems that can provide a desired 
capability, the characteristics of interdependencies between component systems can have a 
large impact on the decision to pursue development of a certain alternative.  Quantifying the 
impact that such characteristics have on the development process can aid decision-makers 
in selecting the most promising alternative.  
Impact of Risk and System Interdependencies 
Quantifying risk is a complicated function of the individual system characteristics as 
well as the interdependencies between systems.   The combinations of systems that can 
achieve a given capability-level can be numerous.  Depending on the selection of the 
constituent systems, the completion time of a project can vary greatly due to the number of 





get larger, it becomes more difficult to quantify the impact that each system and system-
characteristic has on the success of a project.  For instance, a three-system solution may 
appear to be preferable to a ten-system solution; but the interactions between the three 
systems can result in disruption propagation that greatly impacts the timely completion of 
the project.  System interdependencies and their characteristics can impact the completion 
time of a project by affecting the way in which disruption propagate.  In this section, we 
demonstrate the impact that system-inherent risk and the strength of interdependencies 
between component systems can have on the timely completion of a project.  Furthermore, 
we show and quantify how different families of systems that can provide the same set of 
capabilities can have greatly differing development histories. 
Interdependency Strength and Inherent Risk 
For this investigation, we assume that in order to achieve some capability a family of 
three classes of systems has been identified; for instance, a class-A system can be a land-
based radar or an airborne radar; a class-B system can be a large transport aircraft, a mid-
size aircraft, or a small aircraft.  Each of these classes of systems provides a certain 
capability that is required to achieve a global capability of the SoS.   The design authority 
must decide which constituent system to select for each system-class.  A notional example 
of a simple SoS is utilized here (Error! Reference source not found.).   
class-B system
class-A  system
class-C system  
Figure 5. Interdependencies of Notional SoS 
The links between systems indicate interdependencies among systems.  For 
instance, development of a class-B system must rely on information about the development 
and capabilities of a class-A system in order to continue development.  Similarly, 
development of a class-A system needs information from a class-C system.  Different 
systems are available to designers or systems engineers for each system-class.  Each 
candidate system can have different risk characteristics as well as different interdependency 
characteristics.  If we assume that the systems engineer has identified these characteristics 
for each candidate system, then we can use the CEM to simulate the development process 
when different combinations of these candidate systems are considered and identify the 
family of systems that results in the lowest expected completion time.   The strength of the 
CEM is in its ability to aggregate the individual system characteristics and quantify the SoS-
level performance (with respect to development time) of a family of candidate systems.   
Error! Reference source not found. presents results in which the expected 
implementation time of a family of candidate systems is measured against the inherent risk 
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   a)  System-specific risk profile     b)  Expected implementation time 
Figure 6. Impact of Risk Due to Interdependencies on Implementation Time 
We assume here that all candidate systems will have the same risk profile and all 
interdependencies will have the same strength.  Error! Reference source not found.a 
shows the inherent system risk, Rsys(i,r), as a function of system readiness-level, m(i,r), for 
five different risk profiles (five different αi values and a fixed βi parameter of 2).  The value of 
αi indicates the maximum inherent risk of a system, according to Equation 1. The 
assumption here is that risk is highest in the earlier stages of development and that it 
decreases as development progresses.   The results in Error! Reference source not 
found.b present the expected implementation time when families of systems with different 
combinations of inherent risk profile and dependency strengths are considered.  Each point 
on the surface indicates a family of candidate systems with a given combination of maximum 
inherent risk and dependency strengths.  For instance, a solution that entails systems with a 
maximum inherent risk of zero and dependency strength of zero (e.g., independent systems 
with no development risk) will have an expected implementation time of 20 time units.  The 
three systems are developed simultaneously but have no impact on each other’s 
development.  The trends in Error! Reference source not found.b show that the impact on 
implementation time of families of systems that have strong interdependencies is larger than 
when the systems have high inherent risk but low dependency strengths (e.g., the increase 
in implementation time is smaller as inherent risk increases than when the strength of 
dependencies increases).   
This investigation quantifies the impact that system interdependencies have on the 
implementation time of a project.  The results presented here point out the importance of 
interdependencies in the development process.  This type of analysis can prove useful to an 
SoS authority when selecting potential component systems as a part of a family of systems 
or SoS to satisfy a given requirement and achieve a desired capability.    
This simple example considers families of systems comprised of three constituent 
systems.  Different candidate families of systems, however, can have differing number of 
constituent systems that can provide different system-capabilities to achieve the desired 
SoS capability.  Similarly, risk profile and interdependency characteristics of the constituent 





Comparison of Alternatives  
Given a set of alternative means to satisfy a requirement, an SoS authority (in 
conjunction with systems engineers) must determine the best network of systems to develop 
and acquire.  The number of systems alone may not be a good indicator of the complexity of 
a system and the eventual developmental success.  The risk profile of systems as well as 
the number and strength of system interdependencies play an important role that often 
hamper understanding of the impact of decisions.  For instance, an SoS that is comprised of 
three constituent systems may appear more likely to succeed than an SoS comprised of five 
systems.  However, the number and strength of interdependencies between the five 
systems may be such that the expected completion time of this SoS is lower than the 
expected completion time of the three-system SoS.  The three-system example in the 
previous section showed that the strength of dependencies plays an important role in the 
timely completion of an SoS project.  Here we use the CEM to investigate the impact that 
network characteristics (number of systems, number of dependencies, and strength of 
dependencies) have on the completion time of an SoS project.  We compare the 
developmental time of two example SoSs comprised of three and five constituent systems 











          a) Three-system alternative         b)  Five-system alternative 
Figure 7. Alternative Families of Systems 
The three-system network is the same network with three interdependencies as the 
one presented in Error! Reference source not found..  The new, five-system network is 
clearly a larger SoS with more systems and six interdependencies.  As in the previous 
section, different candidate systems are available to provide the required capability level.  
The systems engineer would like to quantify the expected implementation time of each 
combination of systems for the three-system and the five-systems options.  Via a Monte 
Carlo simulation of 500 samples, we are able to compute the expected implementation time 
of the five-system network—we previously did the same for the three-system network.  
Error! Reference source not found. presents this result for the different combinations of 















































































a) Three-system alternative   b)  Five-system alternative 
Figure 8. Expected Implementation Time of Alternatives 
Error! Reference source not found.a presents the expected implementation time of 
the three-system option (the same as Error! Reference source not found.b), while Error! 
Reference source not found.b presents the expected implementation time of the five-
system network.   As in the previous analysis, these results indicate the expected 
implementation time of candidate component systems that have differing levels of inherent 
risk and interdependency strengths.  The trends in the expected implementation time of the 
five-system option are larger than those of the three-system option.  This is expected 
because the former has more systems as well as more interdependencies.  Recall, however, 
that each point in these charts represents a candidate family of systems and one can see 
that the expected implementation times of some five-system alternatives are lower than 
some three-system alternatives.  To show this more clearly, Error! Reference source not 
found. presents the expected completion times when the inherent system risk of all 
candidate systems is highest (α = 0.2). 







































As previously  mentioned, the implementation time of the five-system alternatives is 
always higher than the three-system alternatives.  However, if the dependency strength 
between the systems in the three-system alternative has a value of 1, then the expected 
implementation time of this alternative will be 37 time units; if the dependency strength 
between the systems in the five-system is not as strong, say with a value of 0.4, then the 
expected implementation time will be 30 time units.  Therefore, depending on the strength of 
the interdependencies between the constituent systems, a family of systems can be a better 
(lower expected implementation time) alternative.  By simulating the development process of 
different alternatives via the CEM, it is possible to quantify the impact of system specific risk, 
the risk due to interdependencies, and the propagation of disruptions to compare different 
alternative solutions that can provide a desired level of capability. 
Analytical Approach to Measure Delay Propagation 
  Additional complexity in the model, carefully selected, will likely increase the 
efficacy of the CEM. However, as a simulation-based approach, it too has limitations.  
Therefore, in conjunction with the further development of the CEM, the authors are also 
developing an analytical approach that captures the characteristics of a network that results 
from the developmental interdependencies of systems.  This is an approach that uses a 
network-level metric to treat the same complexities via computations on conditional 
probabilities that relate the transmission of risk in networks of interdependent systems.  This 
provides means to compare networks in their ability to arrest the propagation of delays 
caused by random disturbances and can be used as a figure of merit when designing SoS 
architectures that aim to achieve some desired capability.  While typical networks like the 
World Wide Web, social networks, and communication networks are a result of evolution, 
some networks of military systems created for particular purposes can be designed.  The 
ability to quantify the performance of SoS networks enables comparison of networks, and 
ultimately the design of superior SoS networks that optimize that performance. 
The proposed approach to measure the performance of networks in their ability to 
arrest the propagation of delays is based on the “lost miner problem” (Ross, 2007).  In this 
example problem, a miner is lost in a cave inside a mine and there are four tunnels that lead 







Figure 10. Lost-miner Problem 
The miner can choose to enter a tunnel Ti with probability P(Ti) and has no memory 
of his previous choice. If the miner chooses tunnel T1, then he wanders in the tunnel for D1 
days and returns to the cave, where he must decide which tunnel to enter next. If he 
chooses tunnel T2 or T3, then he wanders in the tunnel for D2 or D3 days, respectively, only 





problem poses is: What is the expected time until the miner reaches freedom (e.g., the 
expected duration of the miner’s stay in the mine)?  
Following this reasoning, we can describe the delay propagation in the system 
development process in a similar manner.  We describe a network of systems in terms of the 
number of systems (caves), the number and direction of their dependencies (tunnels), and 
the characteristics of the interdependencies (probability of choosing a given tunnel), e.g., 
probability of passing on a disruption and the impact of the disruption.  The simple three-












Figure 11. Example Systems Development Network 
Each node represents a system that is under development (i.e., aircraft, missile, 
radio) to achieve some capability. The links indicate interdependencies between the 
systems as well as the strength of those interdependencies. For instance, system-1 
depends on system-3 because information from system-3 is needed to continue 
development of system-1.  Tij represents the conditional probability that a disruption in the 
development of system i will impact development of system j and Dij represents the impact 
of a disruption (delay) on system i that propagates to system j.  These two quantities 
represent the strength of the dependency between system i and system j.  Two systems can 
be strongly dependent if the probability of a disruption propagating from one system to the 
other is high, or if the delay experienced by one system because of a disruption in the 
development of the other is large.  Node F is a sink that represent the arrest of an event and 
its propagation in the network.  In this setting, a disruption can be seen as an event that 
travels from system to system causing developmental delays until it exits the 
system/network (via node F).  This is similar to the “lost miner problem,” in which the miner 
chooses tunnels until he reaches freedom.   
In system development, disruptions can be a result of funding decisions, political 
environment, technological setbacks, etc.  For example, system-1 can be faced with budget 
cuts and the program manager must reduce funding to one of the subsystems that comprise 
system-1. Depending on the magnitude of the reduction in funding, this can have no impact 
in the development of system-1 with probability T1F, and nothing is affected; it can cause a 
delay of D11 days with probability T11 in the development of system-1 that is not large 
enough to impact interdependent systems; or it can result in a delay of D12 days with 
probability T12 that impacts development of system-2.  Additionally, the delay in the 
development of system-2 can cause further problems that delay its development by D22 days 
with probability T22; it can cause a delay of D23 days with probability T23 that creates a 
problem in the development of system-3; or a delay of D21 days with probability T21 that 
impacts system-1; or, conversely, the problem is not large enough to cause any delays with 





Depending on the strength of the dependencies between systems and the 
magnitude of disruptions, delays can propagate and accumulate in a network.  Hence, 
networks with different number of systems, interdependencies, and strength of 
interdependencies will perform differently when faced with random disruptions.  The 
analytical approach now under pursuit may be able to estimate the expected accumulation 
of delays as a function of these network characteristics. The network-level metric can enable 
the design of networks that minimize expected delay whenever random events hit the 
development process of individual systems. 
Conclusions 
The development of complex systems (and SoS) is beset by risk. Risk analyses of 
individual systems can explain the threats and opportunities of systems, but do not capture 
the impact that disruptions to individual systems have at the enterprise level, where multiple 
systems—explicitly or implicitly interdependent—collaborate to achieve various capabilities.  
An understanding of risk in the development and acquisition process and its cascading 
effects is crucial to identifying means to exploit opportunities, as well as mitigate, transfer, or 
avoid disruptions.  
These research efforts center on the ongoing development of a Computational 
Exploratory Model that is based on the processes in the SoS-SE Guidebook and that 
estimates time to complete an SoS integration. The extensions to the model in this paper 
capture the impact of individual system risk and number and strength of system 
interdependencies on the propagation of developmental disruptions and, ultimately, the 
timely completion of a project.   In particular, the present work examined changes in the 
systems interdependencies and system risk profiles (i.e., different inherent risk profiles for 
different systems and different dependency strength) when alternative systems are 
considered for satisfying a given requirement and providing a certain capability.  Examples 
of alternative families of systems comprised of a different number of constituent systems 
showed that the number of constituent systems and their risk profiles are insufficient to 
quantify the development performance of SoS.  The sample analyses presented here 
showed that these characteristics, coupled with the interdependency characteristics of a 
family of systems, can result in expected implementation times that are not easily foreseen.   
When coupled with the theoretical basis of delay propagation and a network-level 
metric that describes the expected delay in a family of systems the methodology presented 
here can improve/facilitate the decision-making process of systems engineers and system 
integration as well as provide a means to design system architectures that aim to minimize 
delay propagation and development time.  
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